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LOST ART AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
Alan L. Durham*
ABSTRACT
Because a patentable invention must be novel, and it must embody an
advancement that would not have been obvious to persons of ordinary skill,
the invention must be compared to the "prior art. "Prior art, in the language
of the current Patent Act, includes anything that was already "patented,
described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise
available to the public." With certain qualifications, patent law has always
required that prior art have been available to the public. A manuscript
describing the claimed invention that had never left its author's desk drawer
would not qualify as a printed publication. But what of prior art that was
accessible, but ignored, or that was available at one time, but snatched away
or forgotten? Can "lost art" be used to challenge the novelty of a claimed
invention? It is an important question because of the light it sheds on what it
means for prior art to be "available to the public," a matter that has been
the subject of much attention since the recent adoption of the America Invents
Act. It also forces us to consider the character of the public domain as applied
in the context ofpatent law; specifically, whether every addition to the prior
art is also a contribution to the public domain and, in consequence,
irrevocable. I conclude that courts should be guided by the policy of
preserving in the public domain advancements that have already made an
enduring contribution to public welfare. Lost art that demonstrably failed to
provide any lasting benefit to the public should not count against a later
inventor who, in a practical sense, has advanced what the Constitution calls
"the Progress of... [the] useful Arts."
* Vice Dean and Judge Robert S. Vance Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of
Law. J.D., 1988, University of California, Berkeley. I would like to thank Dean Brandon for his
support of my research. Thanks also to Professors William Brewbaker and Fred Vars for their
suggestions, and to Penny Gibson of the Law School Library for her assistance in locating source
materials.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1851, Chief Justice Taney delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court
in Gayler v. Wilder,' a case involving a patented safe designed to protect its
contents from the danger of fire. The validity of the patent turned on the
relevance of an earlier safe made by James Conner, the operator of a
stereotype foundry, for his own use.2 Conner kept the safe in his counting
room for a number of years before it passed out of his hands, to be replaced
by a safe of a different type.' No one knew what had become of the original
safe, and there was no evidence that its subsequent owners were aware of its
fire-proof construction.4 The court considered whether, in light of Conner's
efforts, the patentee, Daniel Fitzgerald, could still be considered "the original
and first inventor" of the subject matter of the patent.' The patent statute then
in effect did not allow a patent in any case where the subject matter had
already been "known or used by others."'
Although the Court admitted that a "literal construction of these particular
words" would invalidate the patent, it did not believe that result would be
consistent with the intentions of the legislature.' The statute made an
exception for inventions that had been known or used only in foreign
countries.8 The people of this country would not profit from an invention used
only in "remote places"-"[t]he means of obtaining knowledge would not be
within their reach; and, as far as their interest is concerned, it would be the
same thing as if the improvement had never been discovered."9 In such cases,
it would be "the inventor here" who would give the invention to the public
and "place[] it in their possession."' 1 So long as "the inventor here" worked
independently-"by the effort of his own genius"-he would be considered
the original and first inventor, even though the same thing had, in fact, been
invented and used before." This showed that the legislature intended to
1. 51 U.S. 477, 478 (1850).
2. Id. at 495.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 495 96.
5. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119 (1836) (current version at 35
U.S.C. § 102 (2012)); 51 U.S. at 496.
6. 51U.S. at 496.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 496 97.
9. Id. at 497. An invention used in a foreign country and memorialized in the form of a
patent or printed publication would count against the patentee. That is because through the
medium of the patent or printed publication knowledge of the invention would be "given to the




disregard any prior use of the invention that failed to make it "accessible to
the public.'
12
The Court continued on this theme by considering the case of what it
called the "lost arts":13
It is well known that centuries ago discoveries were made in certain
arts the fruits of which have come down to us, but the means by
which the work was accomplished are at this day unknown. The
knowledge has been lost for ages. Yet it would hardly be doubted,
if any one now discovered an art thus lost, and it was a useful
improvement, that, upon a fair construction of the act of Congress,
he would be entitled to a patent. Yet he would not literally be the
first and original inventor. But he would be the first to confer on the
public the benefit of the invention. He would discover what is
unknown, and communicate knowledge which the public had not
the means of obtaining without his invention. 4
Applying these principles, the Court held that Fitzgerald might be
considered the original and first inventor of the fire-proof safe if a jury
determined that Conner's earlier safe had been forgotten. 5 If it had "passed
away from the memory of Conner himself, and of those who had seen it, and
the safe itself had disappeared, the knowledge of the improvement was as
completely lost as if it had never been discovered."' 6 The benefit of the
invention had been supplied to the public only upon its rediscovery by
Fitzgerald. 17
Justice Daniel, in a dissenting opinion, found the comparison to the lost
arts unpersuasive. First, he doubted whether the actual rediscovery of a lost
art could claim "the merit of originality, or be the foundation of exclusive
right."' 8 Moreover, he found the analogy strained. The term "lost art," in his
12. 51U.S. at 497.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 497 98.
16. Id. at 498. If the question is one of public benefit, it is interesting that the Court required
Conner himself to forget what he had done. See id. at 497. Perhaps the Court speculated that if
Conner remembered his design he might have revived it at a later time, eventually providing the
public with a fireproof safe without any need for Fitzgerald. See id. On the other hand, if Conner
had been reminded of his otherwise forgotten efforts only by the success of Fitzgerald's safe, his
recollection would not matter. See id. at 498 (noting that Fitzgerald's design "was not the less
new and unknown because Conner's safe was recalled to his memory by the success of
Fitzgerald's"). Under those circumstances, Fitzgerald would still have been essential to providing
the public with the benefit of the design. See id.
17. Id.
18. 51 U.S. at 507 (Daniel, J., dissenting).
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view, was "applicable peculiarly to certain monuments of antiquity still
remaining in the world, the process of whose accomplishment has been lost
for centuries, [and] irretrievably swept from the earth, with every vestige of
the archives or records of the nations with whom those arts existed."' 9 In the
present case the art had been "lost" for no more than fifteen years, and in such
circumstances the Court should defer to the principle expressed in the statute
that rights to an invention should be denied to anyone who was not the first
to discover it.20 Such a rule was at least "simple and comprehensible," where
the principles adopted by the majority were likely to inspire "uncertainty and
confusion," with their attendant "litigation and mischief."
2 1
The term "lost art" does call to mind the mysterious techniques used by
ancient peoples to raise the pyramids of Egypt or the trilithons of
Stonehenge-subject matter more appealing to the imagination than
construction of a heat-insulated safe. However intriguing they are to
contemplate, it is unlikely that the occult arts of antiquity will ever play a role
in a patent case except by analogy. Still, putting romance aside, it is legitimate
to ask whether, and under what circumstances, prior art of a more modest
nature can be "lost" so that it is prior art no longer. Patent law today is no less
concerned with the public interest than it was in 1851, and much of what
Chief Justice Taney said about the present availability of knowledge as the
paramount consideration still rings true. On the other hand, knowledge may
be said to enter the public domain when it becomes available to all free of the
restraints of intellectual property. One of the defining characteristics of the
public domain, according to some definitions, is that what goes in cannot
come out, even by action of Congress.22 Is a "lost art" a component of that
public domain, irrevocably? Or should the public domain in the context of
patent law have a more flexible, time-dependent definition? If so, what does
it take for knowledge to become "lost?"
The answers could not be found in the literal terms of the Patent Act of
1836, at least in Chief Justice Taney's view. It is not certain that they can be
found in today's statute. The most recent language, supplied by the America
Invents Act of 2011, appears to place a new focus on the public availability
of prior art, 3 perhaps reinforcing Chief Justice Taney's views on correct
patent policy. However, the statute, on its face, denies a patent in cases where
the claimed invention was "patented, described in a printed publication, or in
19. Id. at 507 08.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 509.
22. See infra note 72.
23. See infra notes 141 142 and accompanying text.
LOSTART
public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective
filing date of the claimed invention. '24 It says nothing about the invention
remaining available, or even being available as of that filing date. Perhaps
the legislators favored the kind of simple rules that appealed to Justice Daniel,
or perhaps they assumed, as most courts seem to have done, that art cannot
be lost at all-that whatever is available to the public necessarily remains so.
Yet there are situations where that simply is not true, and demonstrating that
it is not true may become easier with changes in technology. As we grapple
with the meaning of the terms adopted by the America Invents Act, including
the question of whether terms like "public use" and "printed publication"
mean exactly what they did before, it is worth taking a hard look both at the
possibility of "lost art" and at the permanency of patent law's public domain.
Part II of this article provides an overview of novelty and its place in the
general scheme of patent law. Part III examines the specific kinds of prior art
that may undermine the novelty of an invention, with particular attention to
printed publications and public use. Part IV discusses arguments for and
against re-evaluating prior art that had once met the criteria of § 102, but that
had ceased to be available to the interested public. I conclude that Chief
Justice Taney's forward-looking emphasis on available knowledge should
still be the dominant consideration in defining patent law's public domain.
However, without clarifying legislation, existing case law and the plain
meaning of the Patent Act may put obstacles in the way of an optimal
treatment of lost art-art, that is, that had the potential to become a permanent
feature of the "general store of knowledge, '25 but that demonstrably failed to
realize that potential.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF NOVELTY
The United States Constitution gives Congress the power to "promote the
Progress of... [the] useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to ... Inventors the exclusive Right to their ... Discoveries. 26 During the
term of a patent, the owner has the exclusive right to make, use, sell, offer to
sell, or import into the United States the claimed invention.2 Those exclusive
rights provide inventors with an economic incentive to undertake the expense
24. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
25. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974).
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
27. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
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and risks associated with technological advancement. 28 The Supreme Court
discussed the tradeoffs in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.29 Although there
are costs to the public in granting exclusive rights, on balance they produce
"a positive effect on society through the introduction of new products and
processes of manufacture into the economy," including "increased
employment and better lives for our citizens."3 In order to earn the "reward"' 1
of exclusive rights, an inventor must provide an enabling disclosure of the
claimed invention. 2 Upon expiration of the patent, "the knowledge of the
invention enures to the people, who are thus enabled without restriction to
practice it and profit by its use."33 The disclosures also serve to "stimulate
ideas and the eventual development of further significant advancements in
the art."34 In short, the teachings provided in the patent document constitute
"additions to the general store of knowledge ... of such importance to the
public weal" that the government is "willing to pay the high price" of
exclusive rights. 5
The underlying assumption is that the subject matter of the patent actually
represents a contribution to the useful arts. If the purported invention is
nothing new, then there is no public benefit to justify the "high price of
exclusive rights." For a colorful description of the danger of patented
inventions lacking novelty, one need look no further than Thompson v.
Haight, 6 a case decided under one of the earliest versions of the Patent Act.
The court warned that a failure to insist on more than "frivolous and useless
alterations" of existing technologies had produced "evils of great magnitude,"
28. See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 480 (referring to "the often enormous costs" of innovation "in
terms of time, research, and development").
29. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
30. Id. at 480.
31. See id. (referring to exclusive rights as "this 'reward for inventions"' (quoting Universal
Oil Co. v. Globe Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944))).
32. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012) ("The specification shall contain a written description of
the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise,
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains ... to make and use
the same .... ); Streck, Inc. v. Research & Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 665 F.3d 1269, 1288 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (explaining that a patent's enabling disclosure must allow practice of the invention without
"undue experimentation").
33. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 481 (quoting United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S.
178, 187 (1933)).
34. Id.
35. Id.; see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989)
("The Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the
avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance in the
'Progress of Science and useful Arts."').
36. 23 F. Cas. 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1826).
LOSTART
as "implements and utensils, as old as the civilization of man" were "by
means of some ingenious artifice, converted into subjects for patents."'3 7 The
easy availability of such patents "encourage[d] the flagitious peculations of
imposters, and the arrogant pretensions of vain and fraudulent projectors."38
In other words, the nation was suffering the costs of monopoly without the
expected rewards. Yet, from its beginnings to the present day, patent law has
been designed with novelty in mind.
The first Patent Act, of 1790, provided for exclusive rights to any applicant
who had "invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture, engine,
machine, or device, or any improvement therein not before known or used."'3 9
The second Patent Act followed quickly in 1793. It required that the invention
be something "not known or used before the application."4 In addition, it
provided a defense to infringement in cases where "the thing, thus secured by
patent, was not originally discovered by the patentee, but had been in use, or
had been described in some public work anterior to the supposed discovery
of the patentee."'" Thomas Jefferson, who was largely responsible for
drafting the Act of 1793,42 sharply opposed any patent system that would
restrict the public in "the use of what they possessed before."43 It is worth
stressing that the novelty provisions of the 1793 Act concerned events before
the date of the patent application and events before the date of the patentee's
"supposed discovery." Either could be said to define what the public
"possessed before."
The Act of 1836 added new language that would survive to the present
day. It allowed a patent to be issued only in cases where, before the date of
the application, the subject matter had not been "described in any printed
publication in this or any foreign country," nor "inpublic use or on sale with
the applicant's consent or allowance."44 The defense, also modified, now
applied where the invention "had been described in some public work
anterior to the supposed discovery thereof by the patentee, or had been in
37. Id. at 1041.
38. Id.
39. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (emphasis added).
40. PatentAct of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 319.
41. Id. § 6, 1 Stat. at 322.
42. Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 147 (1989).
43. 13 THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 327 (Monticello ed. 1904).
In Bonito Boats, the Supreme Court discusses Jefferson's views and his comparison of a patent
that dispossesses the public to expostfacto legislation. 489 U.S. at 147.
44. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 7, 5 Stat. 117, 119 (emphasis added) (current version at
35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012)); see also In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 226 n.3 (C.C.P.A. 1981)
(crediting the 1836 Act with introducing the "'printed publication' bar").
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public use, or on sale, with the consent and allowance of the patentee before
his application for a patent."45 The Act of 1839 introduced a two-year grace
period for events occurring before the date of the patent application,4 6 while
removing the requirement that such events have occurred without the
applicant's consent." In 1870, the term "public work" disappeared. Now the
defense simply applied where the invention "had been patented or described
in some printed publication prior to his supposed invention or discovery
thereof. "48
Today, two sets of novelty rules are in play. The first set, adopted in the
1952 Patent Act, applies to patents and patent applications with effective
filing dates prior to March 16, 2013. In the discussion that follows, I will refer
to those rules using the version of § 102 that predated the recent revisions.
Section 102(b) concerns events that occurred more than one year before
the filing of the patent application-a date known as the "critical date."
Adopting some of the same terminology introduced in 1836, § 102(b)
disallows a patent where, before the critical date, "the invention was patented
or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public
use or on sale in this country. ' 49 Section 102(a), in contrast, concerns events
prior to the applicant's or patentee's date of invention. Section 102(a)
disallows a patent where, before the date of invention, the same invention
"was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a
printed publication in this or a foreign country."50 Section 102(g) provides an
additional rule, and one that was central to the first-to-invent patent system.
Section 102(g) disallows a patent if "before the applicant's invention thereof,
the invention was made in this country by another inventor who had not
abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it."'"
45. § 15, 5 Stat. at 123.
46. Ch. 88, § 7, 5 Stat. 353, 354. In 1939, a revised statute shortened the grace period to one
year. Ch. 450, § 1, 53 Stat. 1212, 1212.
47. See Elec. Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu, 307 U.S. 5, 19 (1939) ("This court construed
the [ 1839] Act, which has been carried forward into the revised statutes, as rendering prior public
use a bar whether the use was with or without the consent of the patentee.").
48. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 61, 16 Stat. 198, 208. In I.C.E. Corp. v. Armco Steel
Corp., 250 F. Supp. 738, 740 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), the court viewed "public works" as a
potentially a more limited class than "printed publications," the latter including works printed in
any form and distributed to any extent, but found that any distinction intended by Congress had
been ignored by the courts.
49. Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 102(b), 66 Stat. 797, 797 (current version at 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) (2012)).
50. Id. § 102(a), 66 Stat. at 797.
51. Id. § 102(g), 66 Stat. at 797 98.
LOSTART
To complete the picture, § 102(e) disallows a patent where, before the date
of invention, the same invention had been the subject of a patent application
by another. Here the earlier application must eventually see the light of day,
either through publication or by issuing as a patent.12 Section 102(d)
disallows a patent if the applicant already received a patent on the invention
in another country before filing a United States patent application, and the
foreign patent was based on an application filed more than one year prior to
the United States application. 3 This rule encouraged inventors to file their
United States applications promptly. 4 Section 102(c) disallows a patent
where the inventor "has abandoned the invention"55-meaning, in this case,
that the inventor abandoned the right to patent the invention. 6 Finally,
§ 102(f) states that no patent may be obtained where the applicant "did not
himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented. '57 A "derivation"
defense based on § 102(f) might allege that the purported inventor actually
took the idea from someone else.58
The rules that apply to patents and patent applications after March 16,
2013 were imposed through the America Invents Act.59 The new rules no
longer depend on the applicant or patentee's date of invention. They are
concerned instead with dates of filing and public disclosure. The new version
of § 102(a) disallows a patent where "the claimed invention was patented,
described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise
available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed
invention. '6 Public use is no longer limited to use in this country. The
"known... by others" language is gone, but the catch-all category of
"otherwise available to the public" has been added. The new version of
§ 102(b) provides that disclosure of the claimed subject matter by the
inventor, or by someone who obtained the subject matter from the inventor,
is not disqualifying if it occurs within one year preceding the effective filing
date. 61 Furthermore, a disclosure by the inventor within that one-year grace
period will protect the inventor in the event of subsequent pre-filing-date
52. Id. § 102(e), 66 Stat. at 797.
53. Id. § 102(d), 66 Stat. at 797.
54. See In re Kathawala, 9 F.3d 942, 947 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
55. § 102(c), 66 Stat. at 797.
56. See In re Gibbs, 437 F.2d 486, 489 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
57. § 102(f), 66 Stat. at 797.
58. See Eaton Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 323 F.3d 1332, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
59. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 114, 125 Stat. 284, 324
(2011).
60. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
61. Id. § 102(b).
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third-party disclosures that otherwise would have invalidated the patent.62
This rule encourages early public disclosures as a form of insurance policy.
63
The term "prior art" denotes the kinds of things referenced in § 102 of the
Patent Act-printed publications, public uses, offers to sell, and so forth.64
Patent claims must be compared to the prior art to determine their validity. If
one prior art reference includes all of the elements of a challenged claim, it is
invalid (or unpatentable) on grounds of "anticipation. ' 65 If every element of
the claimed invention cannot be found in a single prior art reference, but the
reference is close, then the claim may be invalid (or unpatentable) on grounds
of obviousness.66 The same is true if more than one prior art reference can be
combined to produce all of the elements of the claim. 61 Section 103 of the
Patent Act governs obviousness, and it disallows a patent "if the differences
between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed
invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date
of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art.
68
Generally speaking, the common thread in the various categories of prior
art is that they have made technology available to the public. The Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals has called this "a basic principle of patent law,
subject to minor exceptions. '69 The "real meaning of 'prior art' in legal
theory... is knowledge that is available, including what would be obvious
from it, at a given time, to a person of ordinary skill in the art.""0 A printed
publication, a public use, a prior patent, or a product offered for sale can all
62. Id.
63. See ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS: A CONCISE GUIDE 91 (4th ed. 2013).
64. See id at 94.
65. See ClearValue, Inc. v. Pearl River Polymers, Inc., 668 F.3d 1340, 1344 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
66. See Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. Verisign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
("[D]ifferences between the prior art reference and a claimed invention, however slight, invoke
the question of obviousness, not anticipation."). The same prior art counts for purposes of
assessing anticipation or obviousness. See In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 1285 (C.C.P.A. 1972)
("[W]hat is prior art for one purpose is prior art for all purposes.").
67. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,420 (2007) ("[I]n many cases a person
of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a
puzzle.").
68. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). The version of § 103 that applies to patents filed before March
16, 2013 judges obviousness as of the date of invention.
69. Oddzon Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1402 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
70. Id. (quoting Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453 (Fed.
Cir. 1984)); see also Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
("Art that is not accessible to the public is generally not recognized as prior art."); Mark A.
Lemley, Does "Public Use" Mean the Same Thing It Did Last Year?, 93 TEX. L. REv. 1119,
1120 21 (2015) ("[P]atent law has traditionally required that most categories of prior art be
'accessible to the public."').
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serve to disclose to the public technology later claimed in a patent. Once the
information is in the hands of the public, patent law's stem commandment is:
"thou shall not take it away."' 2 The "minor exceptions" generally involve
situations where information is not available to the public on the date in
question, but steps have already been taken to make it available. 7' This would
be the case with a prior patent application that has not yet been disclosed to
the public, 71 or a prior invention that has not been "abandoned, suppressed,
or concealed." 71 This kind of prior art may be called "secret prior art" in
recognition of the fact that it has not yet become public. 76 But a defining
characteristic of prior art, outside of these exceptions, is that it is not secret.
77
71. See Oddzon, 122 F.3d at 1402.
72. Kimberly-Clark, 745 F.2d at 1453 54 ("Society, speaking through Congress and the
courts, has said 'thou shalt not take it away."').
73. See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 965 n.7 (C.C.P.A. 1979) ("Basically, the concept of prior
art is that which is publicly known, or at least known to someone who has taken steps which do
make it known to the public ... or known to the inventor against whose application it is being
applied.").
74. See Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Brenner, 382 U.S. 252, 256 (1965) (noting a prior patent
application may be used as prior art in an obviousness inquiry because the applicant "had done
what he could do to add his disclosures to the prior art"); Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis-
Bournonville Co., 270 U.S. 390, 401 (1926) (noting application for a patent that had yet to issue
should be treated as prior art because the applicant "had taken steps that would make it public as
soon at the Patent Office did its work").
75. See In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 1286 87 (C.C.P.A. 1973) ("[T]he use ofa prior invention
of another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it, under the circumstances of this
case which include the disclosure of such invention in an issued patent, is available as 'prior
art."'). The words "'not... suppressed or concealed' ... serve[] to prevent the use of truly 'secret'
prior invention as prior art." Id. at 1286. In a later case, the same court held that a § 102(g) prior
invention that was unknown either to the public or to the rival inventor at the relevant time would
be "secret prior art" and should not be used as prior art for obviousness. In re Clemens, 622 F.2d
1029, 1039 40 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
76. See Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. COBE Labs., Inc., 88 F.3d 1054, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(Newman, J., dissenting).
77. See Astra Aktiebolag v. Andrx Pharm., Inc. (In re Omeprazole Patent Litig.), 483 F.3d
1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding secret information is not prior art); I.C.E. Corp. v. Armco
Steel Corp., 250 F. Supp. 738, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (explaining that in the context of public
knowledge and use, "the word 'public' . . . has been construed to mean 'not secret"'); Lemley,
supra note 70, at 1121 ("'[P]ublic' seems to mean ... 'not secret."'). The one form of prior art
that does not fit the mold is a disclosure to the inventor under § 102(f). Although the disclosure
may have occurred in secret, it can nevertheless be compared to the claimed subject matter for
determining if the latter is nonobvious. Oddzon Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396,
1403 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The Federal Circuit recognized the anomaly, but because of certain
exceptions then incorporated in § 103, it found the result "inescapable." Id. It also found the result
"not illogical," because it would prevent an applicant from patenting an obvious variation of an
idea derived from another. Id.
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Although it is clear that prior art, as a rule, must be available to the public,
it is not always clear what it means to be "available." Nor is it clear whether
the prior art must remain available. Those questions will be addressed in
greater depth in Part III.
III. PRIOR ART "AVAILABLE" TO THE PUBLIC
With few exceptions, issued patents and published patent applications are
available to anyone who wishes to see them. They are increasingly easy to
access, thanks to electronic media, and, at least in theory, they are a source
of information to which persons skilled in the technological arts may turn for
instruction or inspiration. Not every printed document, much less every use
of a prior invention, is similarly accessible, and when products are offered
for sale they may or may not disclose the technological advancements they
embody. The discussion that follows takes a closer look at the circumstances
under which a document, a use, or the technology embodied in a product may
be considered sufficiently "available to the public" to constitute prior art.
A. Printed Publications
As previously seen, "printed publications" have been a component of prior
art for a very long time.8 The term "publication" excludes any document that
was accessible to no one," like the drawings of one inventor that could be
found only on the underside of a tablecloth in his mother's kitchen.8" The
meaning of "printed" could once be debated, due to the invention of new
technologies, including microfilm, that differed substantially from the
printing technologies previously employed.8' Eventually, the courts came to
place less emphasis on the medium, and they have treated "printed
78. See DURHAM, supra note 63, at 95.
79. See Alexander Milburn, 270 U.S. at 400 ("[W]e assume for purposes of decision that it
would have been no bar to Whitford's patent if Clifford had written out his prior description and
kept it in his portfolio uncommunicated to anyone.").
80. Nat'l Tractor Pullers Ass'n v. Watkins, 205 U.S.P.Q. (B.N.A.) 892, 901 (N.D. Ill. 1980);
see also Levi Strauss & Co. v. Golden Trade, S.r.L., 1995 WL 225621, at *25 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14,
1995) (discussing the same drawings). An unpublished document is not prior art because the
public could derive no benefit from it. See Grinnell Corp. v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 277 F. Supp.
507, 518 (E.D. Va. 1967).
81. See, e.g., In re Tenney, 254 F.2d 619, 627 (C.C.P.A. 1958) (holding that microfilm is
not "printed").
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publication" as a unitary concept that can embrace any technology that makes
a publication sufficiently available to the public.82
Because information can be communicated in so many different ways, the
"touchstone" for identifying a printed publication is "public accessibility."83
How accessible must a publication be, and to whom? Although it has been
said that a printed publication must be "generally available,"84 the "public"
actually refers to persons skilled in the art to which the invention pertains.
85
On many occasions, the Federal Circuit has expressed the standard of
accessibility in the following way: "A given reference is 'publicly accessible'
upon a satisfactory showing that such document has been disseminated or
otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily
skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence, can locate
it."'86 The decisions must be approached on a case-by-case basis.87 The focus
is not on whether any particular person saw the publication or could have
seen it, but whether, in general, hypothetical persons of skill in the art,
exercising reasonable diligence, could have obtained the information "if they
82. See In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("The statutory phrase 'printed
publication' has been interpreted to give effect to ongoing advances in the technologies of data
storage, retrieval, and dissemination."); In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 226 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (finding
"[t]he traditional dichotomy between 'printing' and 'publication' ... no longer valid," because,
due to changing technology, the "'probability of dissemination' of an item very often has little to
do with whether or not it is 'printed' in the sense of that word when it was introduced into the
patent statutes in 1836").
83. Suffolk Techs., LLC v. AOL Inc., 752 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2014); ResQNet.com,
Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 866 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Lister, 583 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed.
Cir. 2009); Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
84. N. Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 936 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
85. Garrett Corp. v. United States, 422 F.2d 874, 878 (Ct. Cl. 1970) ("The public, for
purposes of the statute, constitutes that class of persons concerned with the art to which the
document relates and thus most likely to avail themselves of its contents."); see also Cooper
Cameron Corp. v. Kvaerner Oilfield Prods., 291 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (printed
publications "need only be accessible to the interested public"); Popeil Bros. v. Schick Elec., Inc.,
494 F.2d 162, 166 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding a printed publication must be "freely accessible to the
class of persons concerned with the art to which the document pertains"). But cf Pickering v.
Holman, 459 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1972) ("Anything that is printed and made accessible to any
part of the public is a printed publication.").
86. See, e.g., Suffolk Techs., 752 F.3d at 1364; Cordis Corp. v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 561 F.3d
1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2009); SRI Int'l, Inc. v. Internet Sec. Sys., 511 F.3d 1186, 1194 (Fed. Cir.
2008); Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 445 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
87. Voter Verified, Inc. v. Premier Election Sols., Inc., 698 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
2012); In reLister, 583 F.3d at 1311; Kyocera Wireless, 545 F.3d at 1350.
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wanted to."88 If a publication was accessible in that manner, "it is unnecessary
to show that anyone actually inspected the reference."89
Printed publication cases generally fall into three categories: cases in
which copies of a document were deposited in libraries or other facilities,
where persons skilled in the art might seek them out; cases in which copies
of a document were actively circulated to persons skilled in the art; and cases
in which documents were merely shown to persons skilled in the art.
Cases in the first category include those involving a single copy of a thesis
shelved in a library, 9 or materials that could be found only in patent
application files open to inspection in foreign countries. 91 These examples
show that actual knowledge of a printed publication to persons skilled in the
art may be quite unlikely; it is theoretical accessibility that counts. On the
other hand, documents have been found insufficiently accessible where their
distribution was restricted by secrecy provisions, confidentiality agreements,
or the like. 92 The availability of indexing or other search tools is also an
88. Cordis, 561 F.3d at 1333 (quoting Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d
1560, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); see also In re Lister, 583 F.3d at 1312 (a court "must consider all
of the facts and circumstances surrounding the disclosure and determine whether an interested
researcher would have been sufficiently capable of finding the reference and examining its
contents"); N. Telecom, 908 F.2d at 936 37 (evidence failed to show "that anyone could have had
access to the documents by the exercise of reasonable diligence").
89. In re Lister, 583 F.3d at 1314; see also SRI, 511 F.3d at 1197 ("actual retrieval of a
publication is not a requirement for public accessibility"); In re Tenney, 254 F.2d 619, 626
(C.C.P.A. 1958) (stating "though the law has in mind the probability of public knowledge of the
contents of the publication, the law does not go further and require that the probability must have
become an actuality").
90. See, e.g., In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899 900 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Exparte De Grunigen,
132 U.S.P.Q. 152, 154 55 (B.P.A.I. 1958); Gulliksen v. Halberg, 75 U.S.P.Q. 252, 253
(B.P.A.I. 1937). In In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1989), the court held that student
theses that "had not been either cataloged or indexed in a meaningful way" were not sufficiently
accessible to qualify as printed publications. The court reached the same result in In re Bayer,
568 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1978), where the inventor's thesis was neither cataloged nor
shelved, though it was known to three members of the graduate committee. Under those
circumstances, the likelihood that the public had knowledge of the contents of the thesis was
"virtually nil." Id.
91. See, e.g., Bruckelmyer, 445 F.3d at 1378 79 (drawings in a Canadian patent application,
available for inspection at the Canadian Patent Office, were accessible to researchers exercising
reasonable diligence); In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221, 226 27 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (an application on file
in the Australian Patent Office constituted a printed publication). A similar case is In re Lister,
583 F.3d at 1313 14, where a document was only available for inspection at the United States
Copyright Office.
92. See Cordis, 561 F.3d at 1334 (stating that "professional norms may support [an]
expectation[] of confidentiality" that prevents a document from qualifying as a printed
publication); N. Telecom, 908 F.2d at 936 37 (holding documents with restricted access were not
printed publications).
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important factor. 93 In the second type of case, the active circulation of copies
has taken the place of availability in a library.94 In Massachusetts Institute of
Technology v. AB Fortia,95 a paper qualified as a printed publication where
the author had offered copies to about fifty to five hundred individuals who
attended a conference, and the author actually distributed at least six copies,
free of any restrictions, to persons skilled in the art.96 A document may also
constitute a printed publication when merely displayed to persons skilled in
the art. Here the leading case is In re Klopfenstein,9 where conference
presenters pasted copies of their slides to a poster board and exhibited them
at professional conferences for a period of a few days. 98 The display
"disseminated" knowledge of its contents, in the sense of making it
widespread or generally known.99
Some in-between cases involve materials made available electronically. In
Voter Verified, Inc. v. Premier Election Solutions, Inc.,100 materials posted on
a publicly-accessible website constituted a printed publication.'0' Although
the site was not indexed, persons skilled in the art were aware of the site as
"a prominent forum for discussing such technologies," and they could have
located the materials in question "using [the] website's own search functions
93. See SRI, 511 F.3d at 1196 97 (absence of an index or catalog is a relevant factor); In re
Cronyn, 890 F.2d at 1161 (shoebox thesis index was insufficient); Open Text S.A. v. Box, Inc.,
No. 13-cv-04910-JD, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11312, at *5 6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2015) (printed
publications must be indexed so that persons skilled in the art can find them). But cf Voter
Verified, Inc. v. Premier Election Sols., Inc., 698 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (indexing is
relevant but not always necessary). The intentions of the author may also play a role. See SRI,
511 F.3d at 1197 (finding downloadable paper "was not.., intended for dissemination to the
public"); Eaton Corp. v. ZF Meritor LLC, No. 03-74844, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26988, at *15
(E.D. Mich. Apr. 3, 2008) (standard for public accessibility is whether a document was "intended
for dissemination to the public" and whether persons skilled in the art could find it).
94. See, e.g., Kyocera Wireless Corp., v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1350 51
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (a "widely distributed" reference, not subject to secrecy, was a printed
publication); Popeil Bros. v. Schick Elec., Inc., 494 F.2d 162, 166 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding
distribution of materials to members of the public in Japan constituted publication of those
materials); Jockmus v. Leviton, 28 F.2d 812, 814 (2d Cir. 1928) (Hand, J.) (distribution of fifty
copies is "quite enough" for a printed publication).
95. 774 F.2d 1104 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
96. Id. at 1108 09.
97. 380 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
98. Id. at 1347.
99. Id. at 1348. Factors relating to public accessibility in such cases include "the length of
time the display was exhibited, the expertise of the target audience, the existence (or lack thereof)
of reasonable expectations that the material displayed would not be copied, and the simplicity or
ease with which the material displayed could have been copied." Id. at 1350.
100. 698 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
101. Id. at 1379 81.
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and applying reasonable diligence. "102 In Suffolk Technologies, LLC v. AOL
Inc., 103 an Internet newsgroup post also qualified as a printed publication.
10 4
The posts were not indexed or searchable, but they were organized in a
hierarchical manner, they were widely disseminated to persons skilled in the
art at the time of their appearance, and the post in question had received six
responses. 105 In contrast, in SRI International, Inc. v. Internet Security
Systems, Inc.,106 the Federal Circuit found issues of fact concerning whether
a paper made available on an unindexed but publicly-accessible FTP site
constituted a printed publication. 10 7 The paper had been made available for
only seven days, it bore a "relatively obscure filename," its existence was not
advertised, and it was not intended for distribution to the general public. 08
The court compared the paper to a poster exhibited at an "unpublicized
conference with no attendees."'19
Although it makes no legal difference whether a printed publication was
accessible to the interested public through temporary display, distribution of
copies, or deposit in a library, the difference in practical effect is worth
noting. As Judge Learned Hand once observed, circulating copies may be a
superior method of getting information into the hands of persons skilled in
the art:
A single copy in a library, though more permanent, is far less fitted
to inform the craft than a catalogue freely circulated, however
ephemeral its existence; for the catalogue goes direct to those whose
interests make them likely to observe and remember whatever it
may contain that is new and useful. 110
102. Id. at 1381.
103. 752 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
104. Id. at 1365.
105. Id.
106. 511 F.3d 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
107. Id. at 1195.
108. Id. at 1197.
109. Id.
110. Jockmus v. Leviton, 28 F.2d 812, 813 14 (2d Cir. 1928); see also Imperial Glass Co. v.
A.H. Heisey & Co., 294 F. 267, 269 (6th Cir. 1923) ("Certainly manufacturer's catalogues so
circulated are more effective in spreading information among persons skilled in that art than if
the same catalogues were only on file in some public library."); In re Bayer, 568 F.2d 1357, 1361
(C.C.P.A. 1978) (quoting Jockmus, 28 F.2d at 813 14). Newsgroup posts have similar virtues.
Even if they are only ephemeral and, after the fact, possibly difficult to find, they may be directed
initially to the audience most likely to be interested in the subject matter. See Religious Tech. Ctr.
v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1256 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (making a similar
observation in a trade secret case).
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Nevertheless, the distribution of copies or a temporary display means
nothing to a diligent researcher who missed the opportunity, unless the
information can be obtained second-hand. That researcher may be better off
with a document permanently on file in a library, however difficult it may be
to track down. Courts that refer to "dissemination and public accessibility"
as the "keys" to identifying a printed publication111 may be acknowledging,
however subtly, that what has been disseminated may not be publicly
accessible, at least on an on-going basis."12 Similar disregard of future
accessibility also appears in the context of public use, discussed in the next
section.
B. Public Use
Another form of potentially invalidating prior art is a public use of the
invention. The use may be by the inventor or by a third party,"3 but the use
must be public to qualify as prior art; uses conducted in secret or subject to
confidentiality agreements do not count." 4 Once again, the issue is public
accessibility." 5 As in the case of printed publications, the "public" refers to
persons of ordinary skill in the art," 6 and just as one copy of a document
deposited in a library may be said to make its contents available to the public,
a single use of the invention by a person who is under no restrictions may
constitute a public use. 117
111. See, e.g., In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Cronyn, 890
F.2d 1158, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560,
1568 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
112. See World Bottling Cap, LLC, No. IPR2015-01651, at 8 9 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 11, 2016)
(finding a document that is not "discoverable via search" may still be prior art because of physical
dissemination; the present inability to locate it "does not undo any prior public dissemination").
113. Dey, L.P. v. Sunovion Pharms., Inc., 715 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Eolas Techs.
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
114. See DONALD CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 3.05[2] ("A use under conditions of
secrecy is not sufficient.").
115. See Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998);
Carella v. Starlight Archery & Pro Line Co., 804 F.2d 135, 139 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Sys. Mgmt. Arts
Inc. v. Avesta Techs., Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d 258, 263 64 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
116. Sys. Mgmt., 87 F. Supp. 2d at 269.
117. American Seating Co. v. USSC Grp., Inc., 514 F.3d 1262, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("An
invention is in public use if it is shown to or used by an individual other than the inventor under
no limitation, restriction, or obligation of confidentiality."); Motionless Keyboard Co. v.
Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 1376, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Bernhardt, L.L.C. v. Collezione Europa
USA, Inc., 386 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Netscape Commc'ns Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d
1315, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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The most notorious public use case of all, perhaps because the use seems
anything but public, is undoubtedly Egbert v. Lippmann, decided in 1881.118
The invention was a more durable corset steel." 9 The inventor presented a
pair to his "intimate friend," later his wife, and she wore them in her corsets
for years. 20 Because she was under no obligation of secrecy, the court held
this use to be "public," regardless of whether anyone other than the inventor
and his friend had any knowledge of it:
[W]hether the use of an invention is public or private does not
necessarily depend upon the number of persons to whom its use is
known. If an inventor, having made his device, gives or sells it to
another, to be used by the donee or vendee, without limitation or
restriction, or injunction of secrecy, and it is so used, such use is
public, even though the use and knowledge of the use may be
confined to one person.'
2'
The Court was not concerned that the nature of the invention kept it hidden
in use, 122 nor did it ask whether knowledge of the corset steels had actually
spread any further. Instead, the Court emphasized what the wearer of the
corset steels might have done: "She might have exhibited them to any person,
or made other steels of the same kind, and used or sold them without violating
any condition or restriction imposed on her by the inventor."'123 Justice Miller,
dissenting, thought that the use of the corset steels had not been "public" at
all. He confessed that
[i]f the little steel spring inserted in a single pair of corsets, and used
by only one woman, covered by her outer-clothing, and in a position
always withheld from public observation, is a public use of that
piece of steel, I am at a loss to know the line between a private and
a public use.
124
Had the inventor asked his friend to abstain from public disclosure of her
corset steels, it could have been interpreted as "a piece of irony. "125
118. Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333 (1881).
119. Id. at 335.
120. Id. at 335 37.
121. Id. at 336.
122. Id. ("[S]ome inventions are by their very character only capable of being used where
they cannot be seen or observed by the public eye."); see also In re Blaisdell, 242 F.2d 779, 783
(C.C.P.A. 1957).
123. Egbert, 104 U.S. at 337.
124. Id. at 339 (Miller, J., dissenting).
125. Id.
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If Egbert were decided today, a court might determine that the inventor's
friend actually did bear an obligation of confidentiality, based on
expectations or understandings that one could imply from the
circumstances. 126 But there are modem counterparts to Egbert, including New
Railhead Manufacturing, L.L.C. v. Vermeer Manufacturing Co. 127 The
invention in New Railhead was a patented drilling method. The inventor
permitted an acquaintance-the foreman of a drilling team working for a
third party-to use the method on his job site. 128 The object was to see if the
drill bits functioned as they should. 129 Even though the use was not "open and
visible in the ordinary sense[,]"' 30 it was "public" because it occurred "at a
commercial jobsite on public land on the side of an interstate highway, and
the inventor admitted he had no control over the practice of the patented
method."'' Judge Dyk, dissenting, pointed out that "[t]he use actually took
place under public land, hidden from view" and that "[i]n order to understand
the method of using the drill bit[,] a person at the job site would have to view
the drill bit or see it in operation, and this was impossible to do while the drill
bit was underground.'
13 2
Cases like Egbert and New Railhead certainly contradict the ordinary
meaning of "public use."'33 The term "unrestricted use" would seem more
appropriate, although those are not the words found in the Patent Act. It is
public only in the sense that the public may learn of it.'34 The friend in Egbert,
for example, could have taken advantage of her liberty to inform everyone
126. See Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(finding that the inventor of a rotating-cube puzzle had not engaged in a public use when he
demonstrated the puzzle to his friends; the "personal relationships and surrounding
circumstances" supported the conclusion that "at all times [the inventor] retained control over the
puzzle's use and the distribution of information concerning it").
127. 298 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
128. Id. at 1293.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1297.
131. Id. at 1298.
132. Id. at 1300 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
133. This happens in a different way in the context of a use conducted primarily for purposes
of experiment. Such a use is not a "public use," even if it is a use of the invention that occurs in
public. See Dey, L.P. v. Sunovion Pharms., Inc., 715 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ("During
experimentation, the public might have knowledge of an invention (because they see it), but may
not be using the invention within the meaning of the statute (because the inventor is
experimenting)."); Tone Bros. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(experimentation "may negate what otherwise would be considered a public use").
134. See Levi Strauss & Co. v. Golden Trade, S.r.L., No. 92 Civ. 1667, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22145, at *91 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1995) ("The fact of public knowledge [does] not have
to be shown, just that it was possible for the public to have found out.").
49:1257] 1275
1276 ARIZONA STATE LA W JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J.
about her corset steels.'35 If she did not, a hypothetical researcher of ordinary
skill and diligence would be better off combing the libraries of the world for
a single doctoral thesis that might disclose the invention. Furthermore, the
friend may not have known enough about the corset steels to disclose to
others how to make them. Yet the disclosure of such information is not
essential when the subject is public use. A printed publication must be
enabling to anticipate a patent claim-that is, it must include information that
would allow a person skilled in the art to practice the invention. 3 6 A public
use must be public, but it need not be enabling. 37 In other words, a use of the
invention that takes place in public is disqualifying, even if that use does little
or nothing to enrich the art.'38 In 1940, Judge Hand seemed to regret that
noninforming public uses were not treated the same as secret uses, and both
disqualified as prior art on the ground that "in each case the fund of common
knowledge is not enriched."' 13 9 But he found that, "rightly or wrongly, the law
did not develop so, and it is now too late to change."140
Actually, these well-established rules may change, going forward. The
recently revised version of § 102 includes the words "otherwise available to
the public.'' Some legislative history suggests that these words modify the
phrase "public use" so as to require that such uses be genuinely public,
135. See Netscape Commc'ns Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(individuals who saw a demonstration of the invention "were computer personnel who could
easily demonstrate the invention to others").
136. Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 670 F.3d 1171, 1184 (Fed.
Cir. 2012); Orion IP, LLC v. Hyundai Motor Am., 605 F.3d 967, 975 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
137. See In re Epstein, 32 F.3d 1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (with public use "there is no
requirement for an enablement-type inquiry"); Sys. Mgmt. Arts Inc. v. Avesta Techs., Inc., 87
F. Supp. 2d 258, 269 70 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
138. See New Railhead Mfg., L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 298 F.3d 1290, 1299 (Fed. Cir.
2002) ("[I]t is not public knowledge of his invention that precludes the inventor from obtaining a
patent for it, but a public use or sale of it." (quoting TP Labs., Inc. v. Prof'l Positioners, Inc., 724
F.2d 965, 970 (Fed. Cir. 1984))); Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1570 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (as long as an airline reservation system had been used in public, it did not matter that the
use failed to disclose the algorithms necessary to make it work). On the other hand, in Dey, L.P.,
715 F.3d at 1355, the court observed that the "skill and knowledge of those observing an invention
can shed light on the degree to which it was kept confidential." Why? Because someone using an
invention in the presence of "a small number of uninformed observers" would have less reason
to think that the observers could learn something about the invention that they could disclose to
others. Id. at 1356. Although the court is not clear, this line of reasoning makes more sense if a
public use actually does have to disclose something about how the invention works.
139. Gillman v. Stern, 114 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1940).
140. Id. Judge Hand thought it might have been argued, originally, that "public use" only
included a use by a prospective patentee-a use that could have been treated as an abandonment
of rights. Id.
141. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012 & Supp. 2015).
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undoing the basic premises of Egbert.12 How this plays out remains to be
seen. The rules spawned by Egbert have so long been attached to the phrase
"public use" that more explicit actions by Congress may be required to undo
them.
C. Commercial Exploitation
The issue of noninforming use often arises in the context of commercial
exploitation. Under the rules that apply to older patents, the patent is invalid
if the invention was placed on sale before the critical date.'43 The rule applies
whether the invention was offered for sale by the inventor or by a third
party.'44 Because the primary purpose of the on-sale bar is to encourage the
prompt filing of a patent application,'45 "the question is not whether the sale,
even a third party sale, 'discloses' the invention at the time of the sale, but
whether the sale relates to a device that embodies the invention."'46 The on-
sale bar may be triggered by sales activities that occur in secret. 147 Even under
the new version of § 102, which includes the phrase "otherwise available to
the public," public sales that do not disclose the nature of the invention still
qualify as prior art. 1
48
Some commercial uses of an invention do not require placing the invention
itself on sale. A new method, for example, may be used to manufacture an
unpatented product. If the method cannot be deduced by examining the
product, the method can be commercially exploited without revealing it to
anyone. This might be called "commercial use," but because § 102 does not
include that term, commercial uses-even secret ones-have been treated as
142. See Joseph A. Lingenfelter, Putting the "Public" Back in "Public Use": Interpreting
the 2011 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 31 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 867, 894 (2015). In Helsinn
Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356, 1368 69 (Fed. Cir. 2017),
the court declined to address the issue.
143. § 102(b).
144. Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA, Inc., 270 F.3d 1353, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("By phrasing
the statutory bar in the passive voice, Congress indicated that it does not matter who places the
invention 'on sale."'); J.A. LaPorte, Inc. v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 787 F.2d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir.
1986). The on-sale bar will apply even if the party who placed the invention on sale stole it from
the inventor. Special Devices, 270 F.3d at 1355.
145. Special Devices, 270 F.3d at 1354.
146. JA. LaPorte, 787 F.2d at 1583.
147. Special Devices, 270 F.3d at 1357.
148. See Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2017).
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a potential form of "public use."' 49 The traditional rule, which may be traced
to Learned Hand's decision in Metallizing Engineering Co. v. Kenyon
Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 5 ' distinguishes between uses by the patentee (or
applicant) and uses by a third party. If use of the invention by a third party
does not make it public, that use will not count as prior art.' 5 ' Use of the
invention by the patentee (or applicant) that amounts to commercial
exploitation will count as "public use," even if the use does not convey any
information about the invention. 152 Such use "forfeits" the right to patent the
invention, if it occurred more than one year before the application's filing
date.'53 The Metallizing rule, which defies the ordinary meaning of "public
use,"'154 may or may not have survived the recent revisions to § 102. Again,
the issue is whether the addition of "otherwise available to the public" means
that secret or noninforming use of an invention no longer counts as "public
use."
D. Prior Invention
Before the America Invents Act, § 102(g) prior art consisted of a prior
invention, by another, who "had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed"
it. 155 One purpose of § 102(g) was to "encourage[] prompt public disclosure
of an invention by penalizing the unexcused delay or failure of a first inventor
to share the 'benefit of the knowledge of [the] invention' with the public after
the invention has been completed.' 1 56 Although the prior invention may not
have been "available to the public" in the manner that a printed publication
or public use is, in theory, available to the public, one could expect that the
149. See Dey, L.P. v. Sunovion Pharms., Inc., 715 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ("To
decide whether a prior use constitutes an invalidating 'public use,' we ask 'whether the purported
use: (1) was accessible to the public; or (2) was commercially exploited."' (quoting Invitrogen
Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 424 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005))).
150. 153 F.2d 516, 519 20 (2d Cir. 1946).
151. Woodland Tr. v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998); W.L.
Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983); D.L. Auld Co. v.
Chroma Graphics Corp., 714 F.2d 1144, 1147 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
152. Woodland Tr., 148 F.3d at 1370 ("[A]n inventor's own prior commercial use, albeit kept
secret, may constitute a public use or sale under § 102(b), barring him from obtaining a patent.");
see In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 675 (Fed. Cir. 1985); D.L. Auld, 714 F.2d at 1147.
153. D.L. Auld, 714 F.3d at 1147.
154. See Kinzebaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 390 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("A commercial use
is a public use even if it is kept secret.").
155. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No.
112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
156. Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 54 F.3d 756, 761 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(quoting Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Rich, J., concurring)).
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prior invention would be available eventually if neither abandoned nor
concealed. Efforts toward any manner of bringing the prior invention to the
public, including efforts toward commercializing it, might be considered
evidence that the invention was not abandoned or concealed. 157
It is not always clear in the § 102(g) cases whether it is enough to provide
the benefit of the invention to the public, or whether the prior inventor must
also provide knowledge of the invention, and if it is the latter what depth of
knowledge is required-simply knowledge that the invention exists, or
knowledge that enriches the art. 158 InApotex USA, Inc. v. Merck & Co., 15 9 the
court observed that, even though § 102(g) includes no explicit disclosure
requirement, "the spirit and policy of the patent laws encourage an inventor
to take steps to ensure that 'the public has gained knowledge of the invention
which will ensure its preservation in the public domain."" 6 In a contest
between two inventors, a process for making medicine tablets could be
suppressed or concealed even though the tablets themselves were made
available to the public.'6 ' The public might have the benefit of the invention,
in the form of the tablets, but no knowledge of the invention. On the other
hand, if the tablets could be reverse-engineered to reveal the process that
made them, then the tablets would have made "the benefits of [the] invention
known to the public.'
16 2
In Fox Group, Inc. v. Cree, Inc.,'63 the majority of the Federal Circuit
reasoned differently. In that case, the prior inventor exhibited and publicized
a low-defect silicon wafer (the "Kyoto wafer"), without revealing the method
used to create it. Here the wafer itself was the invention, and the court found
that exhibiting the wafer served to make the invention "known to the
public,"'1 64 even though the disclosure did not enable anyone to recreate it.
165
Judge O'Malley found the decision inconsistent with Apotex. Under that
precedent, she wrote, "a prior inventor must show that the public was clearly
given the benefit of an invention, via reverse-engineering, a detailed
157. See id. at 763.
158. See id. at 762 63 (referring ambiguously to a product that provided the public with the
"benefit of the knowledge of [the] invention," or simply "the benefit of [the] invention").
159. 254 F.3d 1031 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
160. Id. at 1038 (quoting Palmer v. Dudzik, 481 F.2d 1377, 1387 (C.C.P.A. 1973)).
161. See id. at 1039. In Checkpoint, the 102(g) prior art was a prior invention by another
person who did not seek patent rights of his own. His efforts had been devoted to introducing the
product that embodied the invention. See 54 F.3d at 762 63.
162. Apotex, 254 F.3d at 1039 n.3.
163. 700 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
164. Id. at 1307.
165. Id. at 1306 07.
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disclosure, or otherwise .... [S]imply disclosing the existence of the
product, without more, is insufficient to make an invention publicly known.
There must be something more." '166 Commercializing the invention might
provide that "something more," although it is not clear whether Judge
O'Malley would demand a product that could be reverse-engineered or
whether the public availability of the product itself would be enough. 6 In
any case, Judge O'Malley warned that "[u]nder the majority's approach, an
inventor could publicly announce that it made a product, with no explanation
as to how it did so, and then hide it away in a closet indefinitely."' 68 That
scenario, if the invention were hidden and forgotten, would entail a genuine
"lost art."
E. Information Otherwise Available
A remaining category of prior art in the older version of § 102(a) is
something that was "known ... by others in this country" before the
patentee's date of invention.'69 Although the statute does not say so explicitly,
courts have held that what is "known" under § 102(a) must be publicly
available.' 0 "Public," in this context, again refers to persons skilled in the
art. ' Like a printed publication (but unlike a public use), prior knowledge
under § 102(a) must be enabling.' 2 The "known" category overlaps
substantially with the public use and printed publication categories of prior
art, and perhaps for that reason it seldom receives much attention. It might
come into play if public discussions of an invention had not been reduced to
a writing. The new category of "otherwise available to the public" serves as
a similar catch-all.
166. Id. at 1312 (O'Malley, J., dissenting in part).
167. See id. at 1312 13.
168. Id. at 1313.
169. PatentActof 1952, Ch. 10, § 102, 66 Stat. 792, 797 (1952) (currentversion at 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a) (2012)).
170. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Chemque, Inc., 303 F.3d 1294, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("For
prior art to anticipate ... because it is 'known,' the knowledge must be publicly accessible.");
Woodland Tr. v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("[I]n order to
invalidate a patent based on prior knowledge or use, that knowledge or use must have been
available to the public."); Carella v. Starlight Archery, 804 F.3d 135, 139 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
171. Levi Strauss & Co. v. Golden Trade, S.r.L., No. 92 Civ. 1667, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22145, at *57 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1995).
172. Minn. Mining & Mfg., 303 F.3d at 1301.
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F. Information Only Temporarily Available
The cases discussed above concern themselves with the public availability
of prior art, but they seldom address the consequences if prior art ceases to
be available. In spite of the Court's discussion of "lost arts" in Gayler v.
Wilder, the fireproof construction of the safe was never available to the public
at all. It was hidden from view, used only by the inventor, and, as far as the
opinion discloses, known only to him.17 The prior invention could have
contributed to public welfare only if the inventor had decided to revive it. In
other cases, the invention may well have been available to the public,
according to the standards set by the courts, but the availability was
fleeting-potentially creating "lost art" of another sort.
In SRI, the paper found by the district court to be § 102(b) prior art was
accessible via an FTP site for seven days, unadvertised, as a backup to a copy
that had been sent by email to a conference organizer. 17 It could only have
been accessed during those seven days, and only by a person who, for his or
her own reasons, chose to navigate the site and investigate papers with
relatively obscure file names-a process compared by the court to
"wander[ing] into [an unpublicized] conference by happenstance.' 171 The
court reversed summary judgment holding that the paper was sufficiently
accessible to the public, 176 but Judge Moore would have affirmed. While
noting that "[t]he more transient the display, the less likely it is to be
considered a 'printed publication,'"177 Judge Moore pointed out that the seven
days during which the paper could be downloaded was more than twice the
duration of the poster board display in Klopfenstein. 178 She found no evidence
"that seven days was not sufficient time to give the public the opportunity to
capture [the] information conveyed by the... paper."' 
17 9
In Alcon Laboratories Inc. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 8' the alleged printed
publication was a list of the ingredients reproduced on the label of a patented
drug. One such label was included as a specimen in a trademark application
file, where it could have been accessed by the public for a period of five
business days.' 8 ' The court found that it was not a printed publication, but
173. See Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. 477, 495 96 (1850).
174. See SRI Int'l, Inc. v. Internet Sec. Sys., 511 F.3d 1186, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
175. Id. at 1197.
176. Id. at 1197 98.
177. Id. at 1202 (Moore, J., dissenting in part).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1203.
180. 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (B.N.A.) 1927 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
181. Id. at 1931 32.
49:1257] 1281
1282 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J.
seemed to place more weight on the illegibility of the list than on the brief
period of its availability. 8 2 In Klopfenstein, the creators of the poster board
displayed it at one conference for "two and a half days[,] and at [another
conference] for less than one day."' 83 That was still long enough for
conference attendees to have absorbed its contents.'84
In some cases, temporary availability seems enough to justify the
treatment of a disclosure as prior art. In Klopfenstein, conference attendees
who were skilled in the art undoubtedly saw the poster board display. Those
who did see it might have taken the knowledge they gained with them, and
they might have used that knowledge later or shared it with others. The
disclosures might have become a meaningful contribution to the art. The
same is true in public use cases where even though only one person witnessed
the use of the invention, that one person, owing to the lack of confidentiality
restrictions, might have used the knowledge or passed it along.'85 The
foreman in New Railhead, for example, might have told others in the drilling
profession about the techniques he had employed on his job site. Similarly,
although the paper in SRI could be downloaded for only seven days, during
that time a particularly industrious or fortunate researcher might have
stumbled across it and made use of it. Yet these are all descriptions of what
might have happened. What if it did not, and the opportunity was lost?
Because of the focus of the courts on availability alone, a public use is still a
public use even if the members of the audience kept their knowledge to
themselves,'86 and a publication is still a publication even if no one ever saw
it.' 8 Yet, from the perspective of a hypothetical researcher exercising
reasonable diligence, if information once available had become unavailable,
"[t]he means of obtaining [the] knowledge would not be within their reach;
182. See id. at 1932 (finding testimony about the illegibility of the label "[m]ore
problematic").
183. In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
184. Id. at 1352. In Regents of the University of California v. Howmedica, Inc., 530 F. Supp.
846, 860 (D.N.J. 1981), the court found that slides exhibited during a lecture were too "limited in
duration" and non-enabling.
185. See Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 337 (1881) (referring to the uses that the
inventor's friend might have made of her knowledge of the corset steels).
186. See Netscape Commc'ns Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(observing that computer personnel who attended a demonstration "could easily demonstrate the
invention to others," but not inquiring if such a demonstration had actually happened or was going
to happen).
187. See In re Lister, 583 F.3d 1307, 1313 14 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (dismissing evidence that no
one had ever asked to inspect a document on file with the Copyright Office; "once accessibility
is shown, it is unnecessary to show that anyone actually inspected the reference.").
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and, as far as their interest is concerned, it would be the same thing as if the
[invention] had never been discovered."' 88
Every indication is that courts regard the process of information becoming
a component of the prior art-via a public use, a printed publication, or
otherwise-as irreversible. In other words, once information has crossed the
threshold of availability, however fleetingly, whatever happens later is
immaterial. The Federal Circuit once broadly declared that "[a] public
use... cannot be undone by subsequent actions,"' 18 9 and it would likely say
the same of a printed publication. If this is correct, prior art may be lost in a
practical sense, when information becomes unobtainable, but it is not lost in
a patent law sense so long as one can still prove its former (often hypothetical)
availability. 19 Deciding whether this result can be justified depends on a
closer look at the policies that underlie patent law in general and the various
categories of prior art listed in § 102.
IV. PATENT POLICY AND THE RECOVERY OF "LOST ART"
As previously discussed, the general objective of patent law is to promote
the progress of the useful arts by providing inventors with a financial
incentive to incur the costs of technological innovation. 191 Patents
"encourage[] both the creation and the public disclosure of new and useful
advances in technology.' 1 92 Those advances benefit the public in the form of
new and better products, increased employment and economic opportunities,
and superior lives in general. 193
The Supreme Court has seldom enlarged upon the broader goals of patent
law without stressing the importance of the public domain. In Graham v. John
Deere Co.,194 the Court warned that the constitutional language allowing
Congress to award patents to inventors is "both a grant of power and a
188. Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. 477, 497 (1850).
189. Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The
"subsequent action" considered in that case was a purported abandonment of the invention by the
party who disclosed it, not, for example, a belated promise of confidentiality. Nevertheless, the
court's manner of expression does suggest a broad statement of principle.
190. On the matter of proof, see discussion infra Part TV.C.
191. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 64 (1998) (patents compensate inventors
"for their labor, toil, and expense in making the inventions, and reducing the same to practice for
the public benefit" (quoting Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516, 533 (1870))); Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974).
192. Pfaff 525 U.S. at 63.
193. See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 480.
194. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
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limitation."'95 In the exercise of its power, Congress cannot "enlarge the
patent monopoly without regard to the innovation, advancement or social
benefit gained thereby."' 96 Specifically, Congress "may not authorize the
issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the
public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available."' 9 In
fact, patent law's "ultimate goal," as expressed in Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., is not only to preserve the public domain, but to
add to it by "bring[ing] new designs and technologies into the public domain
through disclosure."'98 The disclosures add to the public domain because,
once a patent expires, others are free to practice what the patent teaches. 199 At
that point, "knowledge of the invention enures to the people. '2 ' The rule, in
short, is that patents must be limited to those things "which add to the sum of
useful knowledge, ' 21 and the corollary of that rule is that "matter once in the
public domain must remain in the public domain.
20 2
The Supreme Court has explained that the "stringent requirements for
patent protection" are measures designed to put that policy in effect-"to
assure that ideas in the public domain remain there for the free use of the
public. 2 3 Section 102 of the Patent Act, in particular, "exclude[s] from
consideration for patent protection knowledge that is already available to the
public," because "monopoly [rights] in such information would not only
serve no socially useful purpose, [they] would in fact injure the public by
removing existing knowledge from public use. '20 4 Lower courts have often
justified the prior knowledge, printed publication, public use, and on sale
categories of prior art in precisely those terms: "[O]nce an invention is in the
public domain, it is no longer patentable by anyone. '"205 One cannot patent
what is already "known" because the later inventor, in such a case, "has not
195. Id. at 5.
196. Id. at 6.
197. Id.; see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989).
198. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 151.
199. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 81 (1974).
200. See id. at 481 (quoting United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 187
(1933)).
201. Graham, 383 U.S. at 6.
202. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 484.
203. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979); see also Bonito Boats,
489 U.S. at 150.
204. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 148.
205. In re Lister, 583 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897,
898 (Fed. Cir. 1986)); see also SRI Int'l, Inc. v. Internet Sec. Sys., Inc., 511 F.3d 1186, 1194
(Fed. Cir. 2008); In re Bayer, 568 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
49:1257] LOSTART 1285
contributed to the store of knowledge, and has no entitlement to a patent. 20 6
The printed publication bar "prevent[s] withdrawal by an inventor, as the
subject matter of a patent, of that which was already in the possession of the
public. '20 7 The public use and on-sale bars "stem from the same 'reluctance
to allow an inventor to remove existing knowledge from public use."
208
Courts sometimes discuss the issue in terms of a failure of consideration,
or a quid pro quo. Inventors who offer no advancement or disclosure other
than what is already in the possession of the public have not upheld their end
of the patent bargain. 20 9 To grant a patent under such circumstances could be
deemed "a waste of the patent laws. ' 210 Alternatively, the public may suffer
in positive terms because it relied on its apparent freedom to use what the
patent would take away.21' Reliance interests often arise where one might
206. Woodland Tr. v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
207. In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (quoting In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221,
226 (C.C.P.A. 1981)); see also Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 445 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed.
Cir. 2006); Alcon Labs., Inc. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1927, 1931 (N.D. Tex.
1999).
208. Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 424 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting
Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 64 (1998)); see also Motionless Keyboard Co. v.
Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 1376, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
209. See Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 23 (1829) (if one could "monopolize that which
was already common," it would mean "no quid pro quo-no price for the exclusive right or
monopoly conferred upon the inventor"); Pickering v. Holman, 459 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1972)
("The publication bar goes upon the theory that the idea is already in the public domain and there
can be no consideration offered in exchange for the grant of the monopoly."); In re Bayer, 568
F.2d at 1359 60 (referring to "the theory that the patent grant is in the nature of a contract between
the inventor and the public," and observing that "if knowledge of the invention is already
accessible to the public there is a failure of consideration"); In re Tenney, 254 F.2d 619, 624
(C.C.P.A. 1958) (stating "in consideration for the patent grant, something must be given to the
public which it did not have before").
210. Levi Strauss & Co. v. Golden Trade, S.r.L., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4899, at *116
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1995).
211. See Dey, L.P. v. Sunovion Pharms., Inc., 715 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (one
policy underlying the public use bar "is 'discouraging the removal, from the public domain, of
inventions that the public reasonably has come to believe are freely available"' (quoting Tone
Bros. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1198 (Fed. Cir. 1994))); Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. COBE Labs.,
Inc., 88 F.3d 1054, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1119 20
(Fed. Cir. 1996). This rationale may apply most often to commercial uses. See, e.g., In re Caveney,
761 F.2d 671, 676 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (the on-sale bar supports "a policy against removing inventions
from the public domain which the public justifiably comes to believe are freely available due to
commercialization"). However, the policy can apply to publications as well. See, e.g., Pickering,
459 F.2d at 407 ("The publication bar prevents patent rights from springing up which might
prejudice those who practice the invention, reasonably assuming it was not or could not be the
subject of a monopoly.").
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conclude from the passage of time that no one can lay claim to material that
seems unencumbered by intellectual property rights. 212
Preserving and increasing the public domain is not the sole interest
underlying the categories of prior art set forth in § 102. Another goal is to
ensure promptness-both in introducing technological advancements to the
public, and in beginning the process of seeking a patent that will lead, on its
expiration, to unrestricted use of the invention.213 An inventor who proceeds
deliberately runs the risk of preemption by a printed publication, a public use,
or a later inventor.214 An inventor may choose instead to commercially exploit
the invention while keeping it a secret, but, after the passage of one year, such
use will bar the inventor from obtaining a patent. This one-or-the-other
alternative 215 prevents the effective extension of the patent term that would
occur if an inventor could rely on secrecy until competitors entered the scene,
only then to turn to patent system to secure a period of exclusive rights.216 In
short, an inventor who exploits the invention commercially, or who discloses
it publicly, must seek a patent quickly or forfeit the opportunity.
217
With these policies in mind, let us consider the following hypothetical.
Inventor A, a university student, invents a formula that, after one application,
safely and permanently restores gray hair to its original color. He makes the
formula the subject of his senior thesis, one copy of which he personally
shelves in a locked room at his university library. The library includes the
212. See Lacks Indus. v. McKechnie Vehicle Components USA, Inc., 322 F.3d 1335, 1353
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., dissenting) (referring to potential reliance by "would-be
competitors" on the apparent availability of knowledge later sought to be patented).
213. See Woodland Tr. v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(§ 102(b) "is primarily concerned with the policy that encourages an inventor to enter the patent
system promptly").
214. The risks of the latter have been alleviated to a degree by the defense of prior use
introduced in the America Invents Act. See 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2012).
215. See Pfaffv. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 68 (1998) ("As succinctly stated by Learned
Hand: 'It is a condition upon an inventor's right to a patent that he shall not exploit his discovery
competitively after it is ready for patenting; he must content himself with either secrecy, or legal
monopoly."' (quoting Metallizing Eng'g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516,
520 (2d Cir. 1946))).
216. See Lough, 86 F.3d at 1119 (the public use bar "prohibit[s] the inventor from
commercially exploiting the invention for a period greater than the statutorily prescribed time");
Tone Bros., 28 F.3d at 1198.
217. See Netscape Commc'ns Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("The
public use bar serves the policies of the patent system, for it encourages prompt filing of patent
applications after inventions have been completed and publicly used, and sets an outer limit to the
term of exclusivity." (quoting Allied Colloids v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d 1570, 1574
(Fed. Cir. 1995))); TP Labs., Inc. v. Prof'l Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 968 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
("The general purpose behind all the [§ 102(b)] bars is to require inventors to assert with due
diligence their right to a patent through the prompt filing ... of a patent application." (quoting 2
DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 601 (1981 & Supp. 1983) (alteration in original))).
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thesis in its catalog, and it may be retrieved and inspected in the library's
reading room upon request. The thesis includes no claims of any legal right
nor any request of confidentiality. Outside of the thesis, Inventor A discloses
the formula only to his faculty advisor, Professor B. He provides a sample to
Professor B for her own use. She warns Inventor A that under university
policies disclosures to her are not confidential. Hoping to defray some of the
costs of his student loans, Inventor A places an advertisement in the school
newspaper, offering a gray hair remedy and providing his telephone number.
After a few weeks with no response, he discontinues the advertisement. On
graduation day, tragedy occurs. Lightning strikes the library and it burns to
the ground. All of the contents of the library are consumed, except for the
records (kept in a fireproof safe) demonstrating that no one ever consulted
Inventor A's thesis. Professor B is overcome by smoke inhalation. On her
hospital bed, she tells Inventor A, in the presence of witnesses, that his
invention was miraculous, and that while she was sorely tempted to tell others
the formula, she never did. With that, she dies. Inventor A, devastated by the
loss of his mentor, abandons the invention and tells no one about it. Twenty
years later, as his own hair begins to gray, Inventor A decides to develop the
formula after all. But he finds that, in the meantime, Inventor C, working
independently, has devised the same formula and obtained a patent for it.
Inventor A contemplates challenging the validity of the patent.
Inventor A might claim that his thesis was a printed publication, even
though it ceased to be available before anyone had a chance to read it. He
might claim that providing the sample to Professor B was a public use, even
though she shared it with no one. Finally, he might claim that he had placed
the invention on sale, even though no one acquired the product or learned
anything about what made it work. If we could return in time to the moment
that Inventor A deposited his thesis in the library, shared his invention with
Professor B, or advertised his formula in the newspaper, his actions were
undoubtedly sufficient to generate prior art applying well-established case
law. Yet it is equally clear from a perspective later in time that Inventor A
did nothing to enrich the art or otherwise benefit the public. Where does that
leave Inventor C?
A. Statutory Interpretation
Looking first at statutory language, Inventor A has a solid argument if
"public use," "printed publication," and "on sale" are interpreted in the usual
manner. If Inventor C filed for a patent before March 16, 2013, the older
version of § 102 would apply. It refers, in § 102(a), to events "before the
invention thereof by the applicant for patent," and, in § 102(b), to events
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"more than one year prior to the date of the application." If Inventor C filed
after March 16, 2013, which we will assume to be the case, the newer version
of § 102 would apply. It disallows a patent if "the claimed invention was
patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or
otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed
invention. '218 "Before" can be ambiguous. If I say to my daughter "you have
to put on your shoes before you go outside," I mean that her shoes should be
on her feet when she goes outside. If I find her barefoot, she might point out
that she had put on her shoes, before she took them off again. If Congress had
substituted "on the effective filing date of the claimed invention" for "before
the effective filing date of the claimed invention," it would clearly have
discounted, for example, public uses that had ceased to be public uses. Its
failure to do so suggests that the on-going availability of prior art is
immaterial. On the other hand, Congress could have been clearer still by
using the words "at any time before the effective filing date of the claimed
invention."
If it is true that Congress meant by the addition of "otherwise available to
the public" to eliminate as prior art uses that were effectively hidden, perhaps
it would have preferred availability to be judged on an on-going basis.
Ultimately, a use that was available to the public, but that ceased to be
available, does not enrich the art any more than a use that was never available
to the public at all. Although Congress might have agreed, there is no
indication that Congress actually considered the issue. Based on the literal
meaning of "before," Inventor A probably prevails.
On the other hand, plain meaning has not prevented courts in the past from
arriving at some unlikely interpretations of § 102-including the
interpretation of "public use" that includes some uses that are secret. 219 Even
if "before" leaves little room to argue, one might contend, with some
credibility, that terms like "public use," "printed publication," and "on sale"
imply continued availability to the public. Courts have said that, in effect,
terms used in § 102 should be defined by the policies they serve.22 The next
question, therefore, is whether it would support or undermine those policies
to treat lost art as prior art under § 102.
218. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
219. See, e.g., TPLabs., 724 F.2d at 972.
220. See Tone Bros., 28 F.3d at 1198 ("[I]n order to determine whether an invention was in
public use ... a court must consider how the totality of the circumstances of the case comports
with the policies underlying the public use bar."); J.A. LaPorte, Inc. v. Norfolk Dredging Co., 787
F.2d 1577, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("[T]he purposes of the on-sale bar, in effect, define its terms.").
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B. Protecting the Public Domain
As previously discussed,2 ' the Supreme Court has stated emphatically that
one of the overriding principles of patent law is to ensure that information in
the public domain remains there. Inventor A in our hypothetical could argue
that his actions did place the formula in the public domain because persons
skilled in the art could have found his formula in the university library,
Professor B could have shared her knowledge without violating any duties of
confidentiality, and so forth. Had the question arisen before the tragedy of the
library fire, a court, applying the customary standards, would have agreed.
Should we find that subsequent events removed the formula from the public
domain, we would be disregarding one of patent law's central tenets-
"[ensuring] that ideas in the public domain remain there for the free use of
the public.
222
One response to this argument is that the Supreme Court was speaking to
occasions where an action of government might remove information from the
public domain-for example, by granting a monopoly on a technology
already within the grasp of persons skilled in the art.223 If anything was lost
to the public domain in our hypothetical, it was because of happenstance, not
because of government action. The library burned, Professor B lost her life,
and the newspaper advertisement failed; these are the occurrences that
diminished the sum of information available to the public. To say that the
public domain may be reduced through the passage of time and the course of
events seems much less repugnant than saying that government may take
from the public what it already possesses.
Furthermore, one should not employ the term "public domain" too
casually. Critical examination of the public domain is a phenomenon of
recent origin, and the widespread use of the term seems to date only to the
opinions of Judge Learned Hand, 25 who sometimes referred to the "public
221. See supra notes 202 203 and accompanying text.
222. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979); see also Bonito Boats,
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150 (1989).
223. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (explaining that
Congress may not "enlarge the patent monopoly without regard to the innovation, advancement
or social benefit gained thereby").
224. See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public
Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 59 (2003) (crediting David Lange's Recognizing the
Public Domain, 44 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1981) with initiating contemporary analysis
of the public domain).
225. See Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins and Meanings of the Public Domain, 28 U. DAYTON L.
REv. 215, 243 (2002).
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demesne. ' '226 In his foundational article, David Lange called usage of the term
"amorphous and vague. ''22 The problem, at least in part, is that there are
many competing definitions of the "public domain" 228-at least thirteen,
according to Pamela Samuelson's tally of 2006.229
One plausible definition of the public domain in a patent law context is a
negative definition: The public domain is simply the totality of all things that
are not subject to intellectual property rights.230 This public domain includes
the subject matter of expired patents 2 31 discoveries without known utility,
2 32
and the building blocks that have been singled out as "basic tools of scientific
and technological work" available to all-laws of nature, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas.233 It also includes some things, like natural laws, that are
not prior art under § 102, and it excludes, at least temporarily, some things
that are prior art under § 102, like the subject matter of patents that have not
yet expired. Importantly, the negative public domain includes things that are
not subject to intellectual property rights but that could be, without
contradicting any basic principles. A few decades ago one might have said
that business methods were in the negative public domain because they were
categorically excluded from the subject matter of patents. When the Federal
Circuit decided otherwise in its 1998 State Street decision 234 business
methods ceased to be a part of the public domain-at least categorically-
because they could be patented. Subsequently, the Supreme Court, avoiding
the broader language of State Street, characterized certain business methods
as unpatentable abstract ideas.235 Perhaps at that point the public domain re-
expanded.
226. See, e.g., W. States Mach. Co. v. S. S. Hepworth Co., 147 F.2d 345, 348 (2d Cir. 1945).
227. Lange, supra note 224, at 177 ("In contrast to the interests which receive recognition,
the public domain tends to appear amorphous and vague, with little more of substance in it than
is invested in patriotic or religious slogans on paper currency.").
228. See Boyle, supra note 224, at 68 ("Just as there are many 'properties,' so too there are
many 'public domains."').
229. See Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourse on Public Domains, 55 DUKE L.J. 783,
788 (2006).
230. See Ochoa, supra note 225, at 217 (observing that "many sources simply state that the
public domain is the body of ideas and works that are not subject to intellectual property
protection," but criticizing that approach as one that "simply begs the question").
231. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 81 (1974).
232. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966).
233. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012) (quoting
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)).
234. State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
235. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 609 (2010).
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The business method example illustrates the weakness of the negative
public domain. It stands for nothing, other than the present state of affairs. It
cannot be what courts have in mind when they speak of the importance of the
public domain and the necessity of preserving it. The alternative is a positive
public domain, best seen in the patent law context as a collection of
unencumbered resources available for the use of persons skilled in the art.
236
This public domain serves two important social goals. First, it allows the
public to enjoy the fruits of technological progress, supplied to them through
persons skilled in the art operating in a competitive marketplace. Countless
products that we buy at attractive prices incorporate public domain
technologies for which, fortunately, no one has to pay. Second, the public
domain serves as the baseline, inspiration, and tool set for further
technological achievements-the discoveries of the future building upon the
discoveries of the past.23 These new achievements may be patentable, but
soon they too will enter the public domain and become building blocks in
turn. Society would be ill-served if these resources were taken away without
any compensating benefit. This, then, is the public domain to be jealously
guarded, and this is the public domain that courts and scholars must have in
mind when they insist on its "irrevocable nature.
238
Protecting the public domain has become a rallying cry, similar to
protecting the "environment"-a rallying cry that unites interests opposed to
the expansion of intellectual property rights in a variety of fields. 2 9 It is an
important rhetorical counterweight to the sacredness of "private property.
240
Hence, for anyone concerned about the over-expansion of intellectual
property, the idea of prior art exiting the public domain may inspire
236. See Samuelson, supra note 229, at 808 09 (discussing the public domain as a "domain
of accessible knowledge").
237. See id. at 826 27 (referring to the many positive functions of the public domain,
including serving as "a building block for the creation of new knowledge" and an "enabler of
competitive imitation" or "follow-on creation"); see also Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39
EMORY L.J. 965, 968 (1990) (describing copyright's public domain as "a device that permits the
rest of the system to work by leaving the raw material of authorship available for authors to use");
A. Samuel Oddi, Plagues, Pandemics, and Patents: Legality and Morality, 51 IDEA 1, 15 (2011);
A. Samuel Oddi, The Tragicomedy of the Public Domain in Intellectual Property Law, 25
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 13 (2002) (recognizing the importance of the public domain as
the stimulus for further creation).
238. Ochoa, supra note 225, at 215; see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,
484 (1974) ("[M]atter once in the public domain must remain in the public domain."); Samuelson,
supra note 229, at 794 (referring to Diane Zimmerman's "mandatory public domain," so called
because "what goes into [this public domain] must stay there" (alteration in original)).
239. See Boyle, supra note 224, at 70 73.
240. See id. at 70; Ochoa, supra note 225, at 257 61 (discussing the importance of viewing
the public domain as public property, owned by everyone).
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resistance. We should remember, however, that what is important about the
positive public domain is that it is an available resource. 241 If information
becomes unavailable, through no one's fault, then the basic tradeoff that is
the premise of patent law should be operable once again. Exclusive rights for
a limited time should be a fair price, and a good investment, in exchange for
the rediscovery of useful technology. If Inventor A's discovery was
genuinely lost, until recovered by Inventor C, then the rhetoric of the public
domain should not prevent Inventor C from receiving a reward that was well
earned. If terms like "public use" and "printed publication" can be defined in
terms of policy, we could justifiably exclude instances in which information
had been available to the public but ceased to be. In fact, incentivizing the
rediscovery of such information should add to the public domain.
242
C. When is Prior Art "Lost?"
The foregoing argument depends on the notion that information once
available to the public can become "lost." Perhaps that never happens, or it
happens so rarely that it can be overlooked.
One category of prior art that has received little discussion in this article
is the category of prior patents. The disclosures of prior patents can certainly
be neglected, but there can be few instances in which they do not remain
available to the public. In Western States Machine Co. v. S. S. Hepworth
Co. ,243 Judge Hand conceded that a prior patent had "made no impression
upon the art[,]" '244 but that did not deprive it of its capacity to invalidate a later
patent. Although "[a] patent may have lain for years unheeded, as little [a]
contribution to the sum of knowledge as though it had never existed, an idle
gesture long since drifted into oblivion[,]" it would still serve as prior art to
a later discovery "as though it had entered the very life blood of the
industry. '245 He imagined an exception for "prior patents in Limbo, when they
have really gone to the place of departed spirits[,]" but devising such an
241. See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(referring to the "basic principle.., that no patent should be granted which withdraws from the
public domain technology already available to the public" (emphasis added)); Samuelson, supra
note 229, at 808 (discussing the public domain of available knowledge).
242. See Samuelson, supra note 229, at 808 ("If increased patenting enlarges the domain of
accessible knowledge, perhaps the public domain of science is enhanced, not harmed, by the
additional patents.").
243. 147 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1945).
244. Id. at 350.
245. Id.
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exception was not a task for the courts. 246 However old a patent may be, it
remains a resource available to researchers motivated to find it. Moreover,
drawing lines between "unheeded" patents and those that comprise the "life
blood of the industry" would be fraught with difficulty. It is no surprise that
Congress has never embraced Learned Hand's "Limbo" for unappreciated
prior patents.
Printed publications are another matter. Documents may be removed from
a library, and in the world of digital information it is a trivial task to take
materials offline. In fact, the ephemeral nature of electronic materials has
called into question whether they should be treated as printed publications at
all.24 If a publication was available, but no person skilled in the art took
advantage of that availability until it was too late, from the public's
perspective it would be the same as though the publication had never existed.
It did nothing to improve their welfare, nor could it do so in the future.
Perhaps courts should assign publications of that sort to a Limbo of their own.
The problem does not seem one of policy but of evidence. While library
records may show that no one checked out a document, it may be impossible
to show that no one consulted it while it lay on the shelf. Perhaps persons
skilled in the art did see the now absent document, and perhaps they put its
teachings to use or held them in reserve until needed. That would be a
problem in some cases; it need not be a problem in every case. As more
information becomes available electronically, it may be quite feasible to
demonstrate that no one ever downloaded a file or visited a web page. In
doubtful cases, the matter could be resolved by placing the burden of proof
on the inventor to demonstrate that a document formerly available became
unavailable before it made any contribution to the art.
One could treat other kinds of prior art similarly. If a limited audience,
under no obligations of secrecy, witnessed an invention in use, that use could
be considered, for the time being, a public use. But if an inventor could
demonstrate that knowledge of the invention stopped there-perhaps the
inventor secured promises of confidentiality afterwards, or the witnesses
simply did not pass on what they knew-then, in retrospect, the use could be
treated as not a public use, because it did not, in fact, make any contribution
to the art. In the same way, if courts interpreting the America Invents Act
ultimately decide that commercial uses must inform the public, they could
distinguish between uses that added to the sum of knowledge and those that,
for whatever reason, missed their opportunity. Again, the burden of proof
246. Id.
247. See Max Stul Oppenheimer, In Vento Scribere: The Intersection of Cyberspace and
Patent Law, 51 FLA. L. REV. 229, 261 63 (1999).
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could be placed on the inventor. The patentee in New Railhead, for example,
might have been compelled to supply evidence that the foreman of the drilling
team had shared his knowledge with no one before entering into a belated
nondisclosure agreement.248
One problem with this approach would be deciding what it means to "add
to the sum of knowledge" or make "contribution to the art." A teaching may
be ignored because there is no pressing need for it. If conditions change and
the teaching can be discovered by a researcher exercising reasonable
diligence, then what was formerly overlooked may become the "life blood of
the industry." The on-going potential to contribute should be all that is
required in such cases. A patent should not take from the public information
that it already possesses, even if its potential, in terms of concrete advantages
to the public, is still unrealized. It makes sense, therefore, to treat the
availability of information as paramount.249 If an interested researcher who
needs the information can find it, then that information can rightly be
considered a component of the art, even if it has not yet been put to use.
On the other hand, must information be available to all before it can be
treated as a permanent addition to the public domain? Must it be available to
any hypothetical researcher exercising reasonable diligence? Suppose that
fifty persons skilled in the art viewed a poster board disclosing an invention,
but swore afterward that they had not communicated the information to
anyone else. If those fifty individuals actually represented everyone of skill
in a highly-specialized art, it would hardly seem to matter. Even one person,
like the drilling foreman in New Railhead, might use what he had learned
without passing it on. If so, perhaps informing even that one person made a
small contribution to the art.250 In the extreme cases, it would not be difficult
to determine whether art had or had not been "lost." If the art became
inaccessible before anyone could take advantage of it, clearly it was lost; if it
remained available to any interested researcher, clearly it was not. In-between
cases may be difficult, but no more so than deciding whether something
constitutes a printed publication or a public use in the first instance. The
emphasis should be on future availability of the reference to the practitioners
who need it, because that is how prior art can make a meaningful contribution
to public welfare.
248. See New Railhead Mfg., L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 298 F.3d 1290, 1299 (Fed.
Cir. 2002).
249. See discussion supra Part I.
250. Recall that in Gayler v. Wilder the Court suggested that the design of the fireproof safe
would have been "lost" only if the inventor himself had forgotten it. 51 U.S. 477, 498 (1850)
("[I]f the Conner safe had passed away from the memory of Conner himself.., the knowledge
of the improvement was as completely lost as if it had never been discovered.").
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D. Forfeiture
Now let us vary the hypothetical so that Inventor A seeks a patent for
himself, and he asks us to ignore the events of his university days. Let us also
imagine that there is no Inventor C, whose own actions might stand in the
way. Can Inventor A argue that he is entitled to a patent because his thesis,
his disclosures to Professor B, and his failed newspaper advertisement made
no enduring contribution to the art? Perhaps not, because his actions may
have forfeited his chance to seek exclusive rights.
Patent law is intended to encourage promptness in disclosing
technological advancements and in securing exclusive rights.251 The sooner
an invention is made the subject of a patent, the sooner the public has the
benefit of the patent's disclosures, and the sooner the public will have the full
benefits available on the patent's expiration.252 If nothing stood in the way of
Inventor A patenting his formula years ago, his lack of diligence may be
reason enough to deny him a patent today. The penalty would encourage
Inventor A, and others in his position, to bring the benefits of an invention to
the public with greater dispatch.
Once an invention is "ready for patenting," the inventor should file an
application promptly or risk forfeiting the advantages of the patent system.253
A non-experimental commercial use of the invention typically occurs when
the invention is ready for patenting; if the invention is complete enough to be
economically exploited, there may be little justification for delay. The same
is true of a printed publication, which must include an enabling description
of the invention to anticipate. 254 The description in the publication often might
251. Woodland Tr. v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(referring to "the policy that encourages an inventor to enter the patent system promptly"); see
also Lacks Indus. v. McKechnie Vehicle Components USA, Inc., 322 F.3d 1335, 1353 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., dissenting) ("The statutory rule that an inventor is not entitled to a patent
if he publishes or offers to sell or publicly uses the invention more than a year before he files a
patent application is designed to press the inventor into timely participation in the patent
system."); Netscape Commc'ns Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(explaining that the public use bar "serves the policies of the patent system [by] encourag[ing]
prompt filing of patent applications after inventions have been completed and publicly used);
In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 676 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (explaining that one of the policies underlying
the on-sale bar is "a policy favoring prompt and widespread disclosure of inventions to the
public"); W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("Early
public disclosure is a lynchpin of the patent system.").
252. See Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 19 (1829) (explaining that the patent system can
best promote the progress of the useful arts "by giving the public at large a right to make,
construct, use, and vend the thing invented, at as early a period as possible").
253. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 525 U.S. 55, 67 68 (1998); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 149 (1988).
254. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
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have served for a patent application as well.255 Public use may be a less
reliable measure of completeness, but perhaps it is fair to expect that within
one year of a non-experimental public use an inventor should be ready to file.
Accordingly, if Inventor A sought a patent, one might simply say that he slept
on his rights too long, regardless of whether his earlier activities had
contributed anything to the sum of human knowledge.256
If Inventor A had commercially exploited his formula while delaying his
patent application, his conduct would raise an additional concern-that, in
effect, Inventor A had extended the period during which he could benefit
from exclusive use of the invention. Preventing this extension is one of the
reasons for the on-sale bar and the public use bar.25 If Inventor A's
advertisement had been successful and he had sold his formula during the
intervening years (protecting it as trade secret until others discovered it
independently), he should not be permitted to patent the formula at this late
date. 258 The system forces inventors to choose promptly between the limited
term of patent protection and the uncertain benefits of trade secrecy.
In the original version of our hypothetical, it is difficult to see any place
for a forfeiture theory because Inventor A never sought a patent. As Learned
Hand found in Metallizing, issues of forfeiture that may sacrifice one's own
255. There are exceptions. For example, an anticipating publication need only enable one
species of a claimed genus; the enabling disclosures of a patent must support the entirety of the
claimed genus. See Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("A patentee
who chooses broad language must make sure the broad claims are fully enabled."); Schering Corp.
v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("An anticipatory reference need
only enable subject matter that falls within the scope of the claims at issue, nothing more."); Alan
L. Durham, Patent Scope and Enablement in Rapidly Developing Arts, 94 N.C. L. REv. 1099,
1110 15 (2016) (discussing scope enablement). Additionally, an anticipating publication need
not describe how to use the invention, if it describes how to make it. A patent specification must
reveal both. See Rasmusson v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 413 F.3d 1318, 1325 26 (Fed.
Cir. 2005).
256. Denying a patent to Inventor A might delay the public disclosure of his formula even
longer, perhaps indefinitely, by taking from him the incentive of exclusive commercial
exploitation. In the long run, however, the penalty of forfeiture may serve the cause of early
disclosure.
257. See Netscape Commc'ns Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (one
of the policies behind the public use bar is to "set[] an outer limit to the term of exclusivity");
Tone Bros. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1198 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (explaining that the public use
and on-sale bars "prohibit[] the inventor from commercially exploiting the invention for a period
greater than the statutorily prescribed time").
258. See Metallizing Eng'g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 518
(2d Cir. 1946) (after he had "'[held] back from the knowledge of the public the secrets of his
invention ... it would materially retard the progress of science and useful arts' to allow [an
inventor] fourteen years of legal monopoly 'when the danger of competition should force him to
secure the exclusive right' (quoting Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 19 (1829))).
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ability to obtain a patent need not affect the rights of a third party-in the
hypothetical, Inventor C. 259 Inventor C was not responsible for anything that
Inventor A may have done. Hence, the only question relevant to Inventor C
is whether Inventor A had already given to the public the benefits for which
Inventor C took credit. If, in fact, no one profited from Inventor A's abortive
disclosures, then the answer seems to be no.
E. Abandonment and Reliance
In Metallizing, Judge Hand distinguished between forfeiture and
abandonment, the latter involving a voluntary relinquishment of rights.260
Abandonment "presupposes a deliberate, though not necessarily an express,
surrender of any right to a patent. '261 The "legal source" of the principle of
abandonment is that "by renouncing the right the inventor irrevocably
surrenders it."
262
An inventor's deliberate abandonment of rights has long been coupled
with the theme of irrevocability. In Whittemore v. Cutter,263 the court found
that if the inventor of improvements to a machine had "suffered them to be
used freely and fully by the public at large for ... many years," then "he must
be deemed to have made a gift of them to the public, as much as a person,
who voluntarily opens his land as a highway, and suffers it to remain for a
length of time devoted to public use. 264 In Pennock v. Dialogue,265 the
Supreme Court took up the highway analogy:
It has not been, and indeed cannot be denied, that an inventor may
abandon his invention, and surrender or dedicate it to the public.
This inchoate right, thus once gone, cannot afterwards be resumed
at his pleasure; for, where gifts are once made to the public in this
way, they become absolute. Thus, if a man dedicates a way, or other
easement to the public, it is supposed to carry with it a permanent
right of use.266
259. See id. at 519 20 (although the inventor's own prior use and the prior use of a third party
may come under the same statutory heading, they are relevant "for quite different reasons").
260. Id. at 520 (explaining "forfeiture has nothing to do with abandonment").
261. Id.
262. Id. In contrast, the "legal source" of forfeiture is "the fiat of Congress that it is part of
the consideration for a patent that the public shall as soon as possible begin to enjoy the
disclosure." Id.
263. 29 F. Cas. 1123, 1124 (D. Mass. 1813).
264. Id.
265. 27 U.S. 1 (1829).
266. Id. at 16; see also Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. 292, 318 (1833).
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Abandonment of this sort must be deliberate, even if the inventor's only
action is to "suffer" the invention to be used by the public.
26 7
If all that is required to make an irrevocable gift to the public is a voluntary
act of relinquishment, Inventor A supplied that by depositing his thesis in the
library, where it could be seen by anyone who wished, and by sharing his
formula with Professor B, who was under no duty to keep it confidential.
Why should such actions be irrevocable? That is not so clear. It may seem
hypocritical for an inventor to confer a gift to the public (while perhaps, at
the time, congratulating himself on his benevolence), only to change his mind
later and take it away. But the unattractiveness of such conduct in the abstract
is little reason to ignore patent law's fundamental emphasis on public benefit.
One issue may be public reliance on the apparent abandonment of rights
to the invention. The policies supporting the on-sale bar include "a policy
against removing inventions from the public domain which the public
justifiably comes to believe are freely available .... -268 The same policy
supports the public use bar.269 Perhaps where inventors allow the public to
believe that an invention is "freely available," they should not be permitted
to disappoint the public by withdrawing it. Disappointment alone seems a
weak justification for denying an inventor the right to a patent. The
disappointment may be more intense if members of the public were actually
using the invention, and expected to continue. If the gray hair preventative
required daily application, and members of the public had been using it
already, it would be distressing to them if Inventor A could cut off their
supply by obtaining a patent. Unless Inventor A was ready to supply their
needs at competitive prices, it would be a step backwards from their
perspective, not an advancement in the useful arts.270 A more tangible form
of reliance would occur if investments were at stake. Perhaps a would-be
competitor had already built a facility to supply the formula to the public in
the belief that no patent interests would stand in its way. If that would-be
competitor had been misled by Inventor A's actions, or simply his lack of
diligence, then it would be unjust to render those investments worthless.
267. See Shaw, 32 U.S. at 317 19; "hittemore, 29 F. Cas. at 1124 (gift to the public may be
by "acquiescence or assent"). If "knowledge of the invention [were] surreptitiously obtained and
communicated to the public," that would not lead to an abandonment, unless the inventor
acquiesced or failed to exercise vigilance to protect his rights. Shaw, 32 U.S. at 319.
268. In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 676 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
269. Cont'l Plastic Containers v. Owens Brockway Plastic Prods., Inc., 141 F.3d 1073, 1079
(Fed. Cir. 1998) ("The primary policy underlying the 'public use' case is that of detrimental public
reliance."); Tone Bros. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1198 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
270. See TP Labs., Inc. v. Prof'l Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 968 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(identifying one of the purposes of the § 102(b) bars as "protecting the public in its use of the
invention where such use began prior to the filing of [a patent] application").
LOSTART
One might point out that the reasoning here is circular. Section 102 itself
is the principle reason one can justifiably conclude that an invention is freely
available, where the invention had been used publicly or offered for sale for
a period of time without evidence of a patent application. More importantly,
detrimental reliance simply does not occur in every case where an inventor
has taken the steps that might serve to dedicate an invention to the public. In
the original version of the hypothetical, no one relied on Inventor's A's
actions to conclude that the formula was available. Hence, public reliance is
no reason to conclude that his actions made an irrevocable contribution to the
public domain.
V. CONCLUSION
Section 102 of the Patent Act uses simple terms to accomplish a number
of goals. It encourages promptness in disclosing inventions, it prevents
inventors from extending the term of their exclusive rights beyond that
contemplated by the patent laws, it protects individuals who have justifiably
relied on their apparent freedom to use an invention, it ensures that inventors
have earned their patent reward by making a meaningful contribution to
public welfare, and it prevents inventors from taking away what the public
already possesses. When courts define terms like "public use" with so many
goals in mind, it is apt to lead to confusion. In the context of our hypothetical,
one might say that Inventor A's "public use" of his formula irrevocably
forfeited his own right to patent, simply because he delayed without adequate
excuse; it is something quite different to say that the same "public use" should
deny Inventor C's right to a patent, unless, in retrospect, Inventor A's actions
served to add his formula to the general fund of knowledge, or they
reasonably convinced someone that the formula could be used without
restraint. Although familiar terms like "public use" and "printed publication"
survived the adoption of the America Invents Act, the statute's emphasis on
prior art "available to the public" provides some excuse for exploring such
distinctions.
When Justice Taney discussed "lost arts" in Gayler v. Wilder,27 1 he rightly
considered the interest of the public in fostering technological advancement.
If this is the overriding goal of patent law-as the Constitution and the courts
assure us that it is-then there should be a place for recognizing that prior art
can be "lost" in the sense that its potential to contribute to the public welfare
never came to fruition. That should be taken into account when we consider
whether an alleged public use, printed publication, or commercialization of
271. 51 U.S. 477, 497 (1850).
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an invention should stand in the way of a later inventor who worked
independently, and who, unlike the first inventor, did make a meaningful and
lasting contribution to progress of technology. Because preserving the public
domain is an important consideration, art should be considered "lost" only in
the clearest cases, and the burden of proof should be on the party who seeks
exclusive rights. Nevertheless, in those clear cases, a reflexive reverence for
the public domain should not prevent us from recognizing that conditions can
change, and that the progress of the useful arts and the interests of the public
can be best served by rewarding with patent rights the rediscovery of an art
that has ceased to be "available" to interested practitioners. If the literal terms
of § 102 and the legacy of court decisions stand in the way, then it is a matter
worthy of the attention of Congress when it once again turns its attention to
patent reform.
